How The Implementation Of AfCFTA Can Support Development Of The Agrifood Sector On The Continent On 09/02/2026

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KEYNOTE SPEECH DELIVERED BY HIS EXCELLENCY, PROF. YEMI OSINBAJO, SAN, GCON, THE IMMEDIATE PAST VICE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AT THE OECD PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIALOGUE ON MOBILISING THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR SUSTAINABLE TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA’S AGRIFOOD SECTOR TITLED: “HOW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA CAN SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRIFOOD SECTOR ON THE CONTINENT” IN NAIROBI, KENYA, ON THE 9TH OF FEBRUARY, 2026

PROTOCOLS

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I must thank our friends and colleagues at the OECD and the governments of Kenya and Romania for enabling this platform for these important conversations on intra-African trade, and for the kind invitation to me to participate. I will be speaking for a few minutes on: “How the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area can support the development of the agrifood sector on the continent.”

Let me begin by saying that the African Continental Free Trade Area, AfCFTA, which I will just refer to as the FTA for the rest of these remarks, is not just another trade agreement. It is the most ambitious economic integration project Africa has undertaken in modern history, and arguably the most important structural reform since independence. For the first time, the continent has made a deliberate choice to reshape its economic future around a simple but powerful idea: trading more with itself, adding value to what it produces, and industrializing from within.

But for decades, Africans have lived with a painful paradox; we are rich in land, labour, and agricultural potential, yet every year we import USD 60–70 billion worth of food, while nearly 300 million Africans remain undernourished. Africa holds about 60 percent of the world’s uncultivated arable land, but our agriculture is still low-productivity, fragmented, and poorly connected to markets.

The FTA directly confronts this fragmentation. It signals that Africa is no longer content to operate as a collection of isolated national markets, but is instead building a single commercial space, one that is large enough to support regional food value chains, agro-processing at scale, competitive agribusiness investment, and more resilient food systems. That is why the FTA is not just a trade agreement; it is Africa’s food security strategy, its industrial policy, and its employment strategy combined. Progress is visible, but we should be honest, these are still early days.

Intra-African trade currently stands at around USD 190–210 billion a year, representing roughly 15 – 17 percent of Africa’s total trade. That is an improvement, but it is still far below the 60 percent intra-trade achieved in the European Union. Only about 5–8 percent of this trade is fully FTA-enabled, meaning it directly benefits from FTA rules and preferences.
Pilot FTA trade volumes remain modest, at around USD 2–4 billion per year, but they are growing steadily at 12–18 percent annually. This tells us something important. We are in the first few years of what is likely to be a twenty-year transformation. And perhaps it is worth reminding ourselves that no continent has ever re-engineered its trade, agriculture, industry, and logistics systems within this sort of time frame. But even so, FTA is already commercial, particularly in agrifood. Real products are moving across borders: rice from Nigeria to Ghana; cocoa products from West Africa to North Africa; sesame seeds from Nigeria to Egypt; Kenyan dairy products to Uganda and Rwanda; South African citrus to Zimbabwe and Zambia; Ghanaian poultry and frozen foods to Togo and Côte d’Ivoire.

The message is unmistakable; the FTA is no longer theoretical. Real goods are moving. Real money is changing hands, and real jobs are being created. A deeper shift is also underway; we are moving from exporting crops to exporting food systems. Africa’s agrifood challenge has never been production alone; it has always been value addition.

Under the FTA, this shift is already visible. Nigerian firms such as Flour Mills and Dangote export native starch to North Africa, including Egypt and Algeria, marking a direct move from raw cassava to industrial input trade.

Ghanaian and Ivorian processors are increasingly exporting cocoa butter and semi-finished chocolate rather than raw beans, supported by the FTA’s efforts to harmonise standards for processed cocoa. Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire export shelled cashew kernels and packaged nuts. Ethiopia and Kenya export roasted and instant coffee to regional markets, particularly Egypt and Sudan, instead of only green beans. Breweries and food processors are also moving beer, spirits, juices, and packaged foods across FTA corridors, showing early signs of processed food system trade.

By creating large and predictable regional markets, FTA makes agro-processing economically viable. It enables economies of scale, technology transfer, SME participation, and the development of regional value chains. This is how agriculture becomes an engine of industrialization, rather than remaining a subsistence activity. Integrated markets are also more resilient. When drought hits one region, surplus from another can move more easily.

The FTA allows Africa to shift from emergency food imports to structured, regional food systems. At its core, the FTA is about people, with more than 60 percent of Africans under the age of 25; the continent must create between 10 and 12 million jobs every year. Agriculture and agribusiness will be central to meeting this challenge. FTA supports job creation through processing and manufacturing, logistics and transport, SMEs and cooperatives, and access to stable export markets.

Despite the obvious strides the FTA has made, implementation still feels difficult. Border delays remain severe. At major crossings such as Seme between Nigeria and Benin, Malaba between Kenya and Uganda, and Beitbridge between South Africa and Zimbabwe, trucks carrying agricultural produce can wait two to five days or more for clearance.

Many border posts still rely on manual documentation, physical stamping, and face-to-face approvals. Traders are often required to submit the same documents repeatedly to different agencies, customs, immigration, plant health, standards authorities, and security agencies, each carrying out separate inspections. For the agrifood trade, these delays are particularly costly. Perishable goods spoil, transport costs rise, and small traders are pushed into informal routes that fall outside the FTA systems.

Secondly, rules of origin, while essential for preventing trade deflection, have in practice become a major barrier for small and medium enterprises. A cassava processor exporting starch from Ghana to Senegal, for example, may need to demonstrate not only that the cassava was locally sourced, but also the percentage of regional value addition, the origin of packaging materials, and compliance with detailed documentation requirements, and not surprisingly, SMEs often lack the technical capacity to prepare complex origin documentation and, as a result, they either face long delays or end up paying full tariffs despite being eligible for FTA preferences. This contributes to low preference utilisation rates and undermines one of the FTA’s core incentives.

Infrastructure gaps also persist; roads remain poor, ports such as Apapa, Mombasa, and Dar es Salaam are congested, and cold-chain infrastructure is limited. As a result, Africa loses an estimated 30–40 percent of its agricultural output after harvest, particularly in fruits, vegetables, meat, and fish. Without reliable logistics and storage, farmers cannot meet export standards, processors cannot guarantee supply, and regional food markets remain unstable.

Also, trade continues to depend heavily on payments in foreign currency. The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, PAPSS, offers a practical solution and is already operating in West and Central Africa, supporting cocoa, cashew, livestock, and palm oil trade. It now needs to expand to eastern and southern Africa. At the same time, access to trade finance remains limited, especially for women and youth-led businesses. Non-tariff barriers, informal fees, fragmented standards, such as dairy products certified in Kenya still being re-tested in Tanzania or Rwanda, alongside information gaps, policy uncertainty, security risks, and limited institutional capacity, continue to slow progress.

These are not abstract challenges; they are daily realities for African traders. This is why the FTA must move from treaty to everyday trade through a human-centred approach. Integration is not merely signed; it has to be built. Farmers need a stable demand. SMEs need simple rules and access to finance. Traders need speed and certainty. Consumers need affordable, safe food.

So, from these needs, at least six solution pillars clearly emerge: the first is the implementation of digital trade systems such as e-certificates of origin, unified online documentation, and real-time cargo tracking.

The second is the provision of trade facilitation infrastructure, including one-stop border posts, shared inspections, and regional warehouses and agro-parks.

The third is more financial innovation, especially continental adoption of local-currency settlement via PAPSS, SME export guarantees, and corridor-based trade finance.

The fourth is capacity building, especially for frontline government agencies through export academies, customs modernisation, and SME mentorship.

The fifth is policy coordination through harmonised standards, rapid dispute resolution, and advanced policy notifications.

The sixth is intentional investment in regional infrastructure. I think it is true to say that the transportation and logistics network represents perhaps the most critical constraint to intra-African trade. Under the Guided Trade Initiative, a shipment of Exide batteries from Kenya to Ghana took about six weeks because it had to pass through Singapore to consolidate cargo. This example illustrates how limited intra-African shipping and logistics capacity forces detours through non-African hubs, adding cost and delay.

To unlock FTA’s promise, Africa must invest heavily in regional infrastructure, roads, and complete cross-border rail networks to reduce the 77% reliance on expensive road transport, as noted by the ECA. We need regional maritime shipping capacity with dedicated vessels for intra-African routes. We need modernized port infrastructure with efficient cargo handling systems; air cargo hubs strategically positioned to serve regional markets, power pools and digital backbones.

The scale of investment required is substantial, but so too are the potential returns. Infrastructure investments specifically targeting intra-African trade corridors would yield even higher returns by directly enabling the kind of trade expansion envisioned under the FTA. Since these projects are cross-border, we will require blended financing that shares risks among countries, development banks and private investors. And we can leverage private capital through well-structured public-private partnerships.

The FTA must scale through pilot corridors, export clusters, and digital platforms, and then lock in success through permanent institutions. The private sector must lead, and governments must enable.

There is no question at all that unless we apply the same kind of passion, priority, that we are applying to decolonization, anti-apartheid, to inter-regional trade, which is crucial for the survival of our continent, we are not likely to make much progress. Private and public intellectuals must stick out their necks. When you look at the way the European Union developed, which, of course, took decades, you can identify private individuals, politicians and academics who stuck out their necks and careers for the success of that regional organisation. It is the same sort of thing that we must do in Africa if this regional trade integration agreement is to work.

With full implementation of the FTA, not only will trade volumes increase, but competitiveness will be improved, especially by a reduction in tariffs, simplifying border procedures, shortening delays, and enabling local-currency payments. Also, trade costs could fall by 15–25 percent, which will come through lower import duties, reduced foreign-exchange conversion costs, faster customs clearance, and simpler documentation.

For agrifood businesses, where margins are often thin, this is decisive. Also, SME participation could double, agrifood exports could rise by 30–50 percent, food security would improve, and millions of jobs would be created.

At its heart, FTA is Africa’s economic independence project. It is our opportunity to trade with ourselves, invest in ourselves, feed ourselves, and industrialise for ourselves.

The treaty is signed, the vision is clear, the systems are emerging, but AfCFTA will not be driven by ministries alone. It will be driven by farmers, processors, manufacturers, financiers, and entrepreneurs who choose to use it. The question, then, is not whether AfCFTA can transform Africa; the real question is how boldly, and how quickly, we are prepared to make it everyday trade.

Thank you very much.